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Case Comment
Perfume by Any Other Name May Smell as
Sweet . . . But Who Can Say?: A Comment on
L’Oreal v. Bellure
Carys J. Craig*
1. INTRODUCTION
Like much of intellectual property law, trade-mark law can be a strange and
contradictory creature. Its existence is typically justified in light of the public purpose that it serves: in the case of trade-mark law, protecting consumers from the
confusion that may be caused by traders’ misrepresentations in the marketplace. At
the same time, the means and mechanisms by which the law is meant to further this
public purpose often seem to work against it or to extend beyond it. Such is the
case, for example, when the law protects against uses of trade-marks that may not
cause confusion in the marketplace, and which may in fact provide valuable information to consumers. When this comes to pass, one suspects that the public purpose of the law does not paint the whole picture. As with other areas of intellectual
property, the proprietary structure of trade-mark law and the exclusive rights that it
grants can create the misperception that a trade-mark is a piece of property that is
owned like any other. Regarded in this way, protection expands, tending towards
absolute, while the rights and freedoms of others (the buying public, the market
competitor) tend to pale in comparison. In my opinion, this tendency towards the
propertization of trade-marks and the corresponding relegation of the public interest is well illustrated by the recent ruling of the European Court of Justice in the
case of L’Oreal SA v. Bellure NV84, as (reluctantly) applied by the Court of Appeal
of England and Wales.85
In this comment, I will begin by explaining, in section 2, the facts of the case,
the ruling of the ECJ and its unenthusiastic reception by the British court. Section 3
will identify and explore the primary concerns raised by the ECJ ruling and identified by the British court, focusing in particular on its effective prohibition of “freeriding” and its disregard for the principles of free expression. In section 4, I will
canvass some lessons that should be drawn from this unfortunate case and heeded
in the Canadian context.

*
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Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, LL.B. (Hons)
(University of Edinburgh), LL.M. (Queen’s University), S.J.D. (University of
Toronto). Thanks to Tamsin Thomas for her excellent research assistance.
L’Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, [2009] EUECJ C-487/07 (CA (Civ Div) 2009) [L’Oréal
(ECJ)].
L’Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, [2010] EWCA Civ 535, [2010] E.T.M.R. 47, [2010] R.P.C.
23, 107(22) L.S.G. 17, 154(21) S.J.L.B. 30 (CA (Civ Div) 2010) [L’Oréal (EWCA 2)].
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2. THE L’ORÉAL CASE
(a) Background, Facts and Issues
The L’Oréal case concerns the marketing of so-called “smell-alike” perfumes.
The L’Oréal Group manufactures well-known, high-end perfumes including
“Anaı̈s-Anaı̈s,” “Miracle,” “Noa” and “Trésor.” The defendants produced and distributed a range of fragrances each of which was designed to emulate a famous,
luxury brand perfume. Of course, Bellure’s perfumes were sold at significantly
cheaper retail prices, at more “downmarket” outlets and to a different clientele.
Thus, for example, a fine fragrance like L’Oréal’s Trésor will sell at £60 or more,
while a corresponding replica would go for £2-4 on a market stall.
It should already be clear from these facts that consumer confusion is not at
issue in this case. As the Court of Appeal noted in its initial ruling, “[t]he public are
not stupid. It is not suggested that anyone ever thinks a “replica” product of [this]
kind is the original or comes from or is approved by the same commercial source as
the original. Nor is it suggested that anyone thinks a replica is anything other than a
cheap imitation of the original or is likely to be of the same quality as the original,
even though it may smell somewhat the same.”86 Nor is there any harm or loss
suffered by the plaintiff of the kind typical in trade-mark infringement cases: there
is no likely diversion of trade away from the plaintiff because, as the court noted,
“the parties’ products are not in competition with each other. They are in different
price and market sectors.”87 Those consumers who are willing and able to pay for
the luxury brand perfume are unlikely to regard the cheap replica as a desirable
substitute.
Notwithstanding the absence of confusion or diversion of trade, however,
L’Oréal objected to the defendant’s use of the registered trade-marks “Anaı̈sAnaı̈s,” “Miracle,” “Noa” and “Trésor” in comparison lists, which were distributed
by the defendants to retailers in order to indicate the particular famous brand that
each of its products were designed to imitate. It further objected to the use of allusive packaging, which was designed to give “a wink of an eye to existing branded
product.”88
It is important to stress, first, that the copying of the fragrances themselves
was agreed by all parties to be perfectly lawful, and second, that the replica packaging was found at trial not to resemble that of the brand product to the extent that it
could constitute a misrepresentation to the public (a conclusion with which the
Court of Appeal agreed). As such, the remaining issues concerned the lawfulness of
the comparison lists bearing the plaintiff’s registered trade-marks, and the general
question of whether the defendant’s marketing practices (the use of similar names,
product packaging and comparison lists) took “unfair advantage” of the reputation
attached to the plaintiff’s marks.
These issues were to be determined under the European Trade Marks Direc-
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L’Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, [2007] EWCA Civ 968, [2008] E.C.C. 5, [2008] E.T.M.R. 1,
[2008] R.P.C. 9 (CA (Civ Div) 2007) [L’Oréal EWCA 1] at para. 6, Jacob J.
Ibid. at para. 7.
Ibid.
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tive [TMD].89 Specifically, Article 5(1)(a) of the TMD entitles the owner of a
trade-mark to prevent unauthorized third parties “from using in the course of trade
any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services
which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered.” Article 5(2)
offers broader protection against the use in trade of any identical or similar sign
having “a reputation in the Member State . . . where use of that sign without due
cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the
repute of the trade mark.” Also relevant were provisions relating to comparative
advertising under the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive [CAD].90
Article 3a of the CAD provides that comparative advertising is permitted where
certain specified conditions are met, including: (a) it is not misleading; (d) it does
not create confusion in the marketplace; (g) it “does not take unfair advantage of
the reputation of a trade-mark . . . of a competitor”; and (h) it “does not present
goods or services as imitations or replicas of goods or services bearing a protected
trade mark.”91

(b) The Ruling of the ECJ
The Court of Appeal referred five questions to the European Court of Justice
by way of preliminary reference: questions 1 and 2 concerned the scope and applicability of Article 5(1)(a) to the use of the plaintiff’s trade-marks on the comparison lists; questions 3 and 4 related to the potential availability of a comparative
advertising defence; and question 5 asked whether the use of a sign could amount
to the taking of an “unfair advantage” within the meaning of Article 5(2) simply
because the trader enjoys a “commercial advantage” by virtue of that use.
Regarding the first and second questions, the ECJ concluded that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trade-marks in the comparison lists could amount to an
infringement of the plaintiff’s right under Article 5(1)(a). It reasoned that the lists
made use of trade-marks identical to those registered and in relation to identical
goods for which the marks were registered. It was agreed that not every such

89

90

91

First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of
the Member States relating to Trade Marks OK 1989 L40/1 (unmodified in Directive
2008/95/EEC of 22 October 2008 OJ 2008 L299/25). The national UK legislation implementing these provisions is s. 10 (for Art. 5) and s. 11 (for Art. 6) of the Trade
Marks Act 1994, c. 26.
Council Directive 84/450 EEC of 10 September 1984 Concerning Misleading and
Comparative Advertising (OJ 1984 L250/17) as amended by Directive 97/55/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997, OK 1997 L290/18. The
provisions of Article 3a Directive 84/450 were transposed into national law by the
Control of Misleading Advertisements (Amendment) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/914),
which introduced a new regulation 4A into the Control of Misleading Advertisements
(Amendment) Regulations 1988 (SI 1988/915).
A use in comparative advertising that meets the conditions set out in Article 3a of the
CAD will escape infringement by virtue of Art. 6(1)(b) of the TMD, which provides:
“The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using, in
the course of trade . . . indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of the
service, or other characteristics of goods or services.”
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“double identity” use would infringe the owner’s exclusive right as “the exercise of
that right must be reserved to cases in which a third party’s use of the sign affects
or is liable to affect the functions of the trade-mark.”92 A purely descriptive use
would therefore be excluded from the scope of Article 5(1) as it would not “affect
any of the interests which that provision is intended to protect” and so would not
constitute “use” within the meaning of that provision.93 An unlawful use, however,
need not be a use that affects the “essential function of the mark,” namely the indication of origin of the goods or services; the use will also be prohibited if it affects
a trade-mark’s “other functions, in particular that of guaranteeing the quality of the
goods or services in question and those of communication, investment or advertising.”94 The Court was seemingly of the opinion that the defendant’s use in this case
implicated the advertising function of the protected marks.95
With regard to the third and fourth questions, the ECJ agreed that the comparison lists could nonetheless be permitted as comparative advertising if they satisfied
the conditions set out in Article 3a of the CAD. The Court found, however, that the
defendant’s comparison lists “present the goods marketed by the advertiser as being
imitations of goods bearing a protected trade-mark within the meaning of Article
3a(1)(h),” thereby removing them from the protective scope of the comparative advertising defence. It further opined that the advantage gained by the advertiser as a
result of this unlawful comparative advertising must therefore be considered “an
advantage taken unfairly of the reputation of that mark within the meaning of Article 3a(1)(g).”96
Finally, in response to the fifth question, the ECJ broadly interpreted the
meaning of “unfair advantage,” finding that, even in the absence of confusion or
likely damage to the distinctive character or reputation of the mark, Article 5(2) of
the TMD may be infringed by the use of a similar mark where a third party “seeks
by that use to ride on the coat-tails of the mark with a reputation.” In this way,
advantage is unfairly taken where the third party aims “to benefit from the power of
attraction, the reputation and the prestige of that mark and to exploit, without paying any financial compensation, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of
the mark in order to create and maintain the mark’s image.”97 The ECJ thus appeared to favour a prohibition on “free-riding” or “parasitism” per se,98 which “relates not to the detriment caused to the mark but to the advantage taken by the third
party.”99

92
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L’Oréal (ECJ), supra note 1 at para. 58.
Ibid. at para. 61; citing Holterhoff v. Freiesleben (C2/00), [2002] All E.R. (EC) 665,
[2002] EUECJ C-2/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-4187, [2002] E.T.M.R. 79, [2002] F.S.R. 52,
¶16 (ECJ 2002).
L’Oréal (ECJ), ibid. at para 58 [emphasis added].
Ibid. at para. 62.
Ibid. at para. 80.
Ibid. at para. 50.
Dev Gangee & Robert Burrell, “Because You’re Worth It: L’Oréal and the Prohibition
on Free Riding” (2010) 73 Mod. L. Rev. 282 at 288.
L’Oreal (ECJ), supra note 1 at para. 41.
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(c) The Court of Appeal’s Reluctant Ruling
Jacob L.J., writing for a unanimous Court, followed the ECJ’s judgment with
explicit regret.100 On the first issue, Jacob L.J. understood the ECJ to have said
that, in same mark/same goods cases, a defendant can only take his use outside of
Article 5(1)(a) by showing that his use is “for purely descriptive purposes.”101 If
any of the trade-mark functions of communication, investment or advertising are
liable to be affected by the use, then the Article 5(1)(a) prohibition is activated.
Because the defendant’s use here is use for advertising, it is not “purely descriptive” and is therefore prohibited. Jacob L.J. also declared, however, that he had
“real difficulty with these functions when divorced from the origin function. There
is nothing in the legislation about them. Conceptually they are vague and ill-defined.” He speculated about the difficulty of drawing a line between a would-be
seller’s discussion with a potential buyer in which the trade-mark is referenced and
a general purpose advertising aid. Ultimately, it was held that the defendant’s comparison lists fell on the wrong side of this elusive line, but only “[b]ecause the
[ECJ] has said so.”102
With regard to the availability of a comparative advertising defence, the Court
of Appeal again felt obliged to follow the ECJ’s judgment and give the conditions
required of comparative advertising a “wide meaning.”103 Thus the Article 3a(1)(h)
condition, which prevents the representation of goods “as imitations or replicas,”
could not be confined to counterfeit products as the defendants had argued. Rather,
the truthful statement that the defendant’s product shares an “essential characteristic” (i.e. the same smell) with the trade-mark owner’s product “amounts to saying
the product is an ‘imitation or replica’ and so outside the protection of the
CAD.”104 While Jacob L.J. felt “forced to so conclude,”105 he questioned the rational basis for such a rule, asking, “[i]f a man trades in lawful replicas or in lawful
copies, why should he not be able to inform the public what they are? And why
should the truth be kept from the public?”106 Jacob L.J. was also unimpressed by
the composite approach taken by the ECJ to conditions 3a(1)(h) and (g). While the
ECJ had held that a comparative advertisement that did not comply with (h) necessarily took “unfair advantage” of the plaintiff’s trade-mark within the meaning of
(g), Jacob L.J. opined that telling the truth about a lawful product does not involve
any “unfair advantage.” However, because the comparative advertising did not
comply with Article 3a(1) of the CAD, the Court of Appeal held that the comparative lists were unlawful under Article 5(1)(a) of the TMD.
Regarding the final issue, the scope of Article 5(2) and the meaning of “unfair

100
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L’Oreal (EWCA 2), supra note 2 at para. 7: “My duty as a national judge is to follow
EU law as interpreted by the ECJ. I think, with regret, that the answers we have received from the ECJ require us to so hold.”
Ibid. at para. 28.
Ibid. at para 31.
Ibid. at para 37.
Ibid. at para. 38.
Ibid.
Ibid. at para. 39.
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advantage,” Jacob L.J. again objected to the ECJ’s judgment but felt duty-bound to
apply it. In particular, he noted that the ECJ effectively rendered the word “unfair”
meaningless when it assumed that all “free-riding” or “exploitation on the coattails” of a mark with repute is ipso facto unfair. He criticized the conclusion that
free-riding is always unfair as one that is “high in moral content (the thought is
clearly that copyists, even of lawful products should be condemned).”107 The result, according to Jacob L.J., is the creation of “a pointless monopoly.”108

3. SOME DEEP WRINKLES IN L’ORÉAL’S LOGIC
(a) The Rule Against Free-Riding: Propertizing the Mark
The L’Oréal ruling has proved to be extremely controversial on a number of
fronts. Perhaps the most fundamental problem posed by the case is the introduction
of an apparent “free-riding rule” through the ECJ’s interpretation of Article 5(2) of
the TMD,109 and the implications of this rule on the possibilities for comparative
marketing in Europe. Jacob L.J. was clearly troubled by the language of free-riding
even in his first judgment in this case, in which he remarked: “Although that expression [“free riding”] has crept into European Trade Mark law . . . it is, to me at
least, subtly and dangerously emotive: It carries the unwritten message that it ought
to be stopped.”110 As Jacob L.J. went on to note, there is no clear reason why freeriding should be regarded as necessarily unlawful or even undesirable. It is typically assumed that imitation is permitted unless there is a good reason for the law to
intervene to prevent it, not least because “[r]eferencing activity and building on the
efforts of others are fundamental to creative and competitive processes.”111 The
ECJ failed to provide any clear explanation for why free-riding should be prevented
in the absence of confusion or harm to the mark’s reputation. Rather, it adopted
language (“deprecatory metaphorical expressions”112 such as “parasitism” and
“riding on the coattails”) that implied an inherent evil or moral failing in the act of
taking advantage of another’s labour or success.
As Gangee and Burrell argue, there is little in terms of economic theory that
would justify a broad prohibition against taking advantage of another’s reputation
or market presence. From an economic perspective, the “problem” of free-riding is
typically associated with the existence of a “positive externality” — a benefit enjoyed by a third party outside of any economic transaction. The risk is that the
benefit-generating activity will not receive adequate incentivization through the
market unless its full value is captured by the market; hence, the drive to “internalize” externalities. However, as Mark Lemley reminds us, not every positive externality needs to be internalised — the enjoyment we may take in a neighbour’s

107
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Ibid. at para. 49.
Ibid. at para. 50.
See Mats Björkenfeldt, “The Genie is Out of the Bottle: the ECJ’d Decision in L’Oréal
v. Bellure” (2010) 5 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Practice 105.
L’Oréal (EWCA 1), supra note 3 at para. 27; quoted in L’Oréal (EWCA 2), supra note
2 at para. 16.
Gangee & Burrell, supra note 15 at 282; quoted in L’Oréal (EWCA 2), ibid. at para. 18.
L’Oréal (EWCA 2), ibid. at para. 17.
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beautiful garden, for example, is a social gain whose value need not be captured by
the market.113 Moreover, the level of protection afforded by the law, where it does
intervene, should be no more than that required to incentivize the benefit-producing
activity; in the case of trade-mark law, “given the advantages that accrue to the
owner of an established brand it is difficult to see that there is any danger of ‘undersupply’ that trade mark law needs to guard against.”114
There are plenty of examples in trade-mark (and other intellectual property)
jurisprudence where a second-comer clearly reaps the benefits of the efforts that
have been made by those who first entered the marketplace and created demand for
a particular kind of product. In such cases, courts have generally recognized that
there is no inherent wrong in taking advantage of this benefit; on the contrary, such
activities are part of a healthy competitive market. In the case of CadburySchweppes Pty Ltd v. Pub Squash Co Pty Ltd., for example, the court famously
stated that “[a] defendant does no wrong by entering a market created by another
and there competing with its creator. The line may be difficult to draw; but, unless
it is drawn, competition will be stifled.”115 (The absence of any misrepresentation
or confusion placed the defendant’s marketing strategies on the right side of the
line in that case.) As Lemley notes, intellectual property law has traditionally been
“chock full of opportunities to free ride” as a result of limits on the kinds of works
that are protected, the kinds of rights that are granted, their limited duration, as well
as exceptions and defences to infringement claims. If the goal of intellectual property is to prevent free-riding, however, then these essential limits begin to look
like loopholes that should be excised wherever possible.116
The tendency towards absolute protection of a trade-mark against free-riding
by competitors is intrinsically tied to an understanding of the trade-mark owner as a
bearer of property. As trade-marks take on the character of property, the scope of
the owner’s rights grow, such that they prevent various kinds of uses of the mark
that cause no confusion or increase in consumer search costs.117 If the trade-mark
(or the reputation that it embodies) is regarded as a property right, then any incursion on, or benefit gained from, that mark or its reputation begins to look like unlawful trespass (or “unfair advantage”). The role of the law shifts from one of safe-

113
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See Mark Lemley, “Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding” (2005) 83 Tex. L.
Rev 1032 at 1048-49.
Gangee & Burrell, supra note 15 at 290. See also D. Barnes, “Trade-mark Externalities” (2007) 10 Yale J. Law & Tech. 1.
1980 WL 254827 (NSWSC); [1980] 2 NSWLR 864 (Privy Council 1980). In this case,
the plaintiff had successfully launched and widely advertised a lemon-flavoured soft
drink. Its market was undercut by the defendant who quickly launched a similar product, sold in similar cans and marketed along similar lines. There was no evidence of
consumer confusion, however, and so no tortious act.
Lemley, supra note 29 at 1041-42. See also Annette Kur, Lionel Bently & Ansgar
Ohly, “Sweet Smells and a Sour Taste — The ECJ’s L’Oreal Decision,” Max Planck
Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Series No.
09-12 at 3: “To hold that imitation is free where it is not precluded by intellectual
property is a basic tenet of the system — generations of law professors have taught that
rule.” [Kur et al.]
Cp. Ibid.
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guarding the public interest to protecting private property. This would explain why,
“in the ECJ’s decision in L’Oréal, one may look in vain for a discussion of any
possible negative impact of social welfare,” and why “the court did not take any
note of the imposed costs to the other traders or the consumers” that would result
from restricting the use of the mark in the comparative lists.118 As Gangee and
Burrell note, “[i]n effect, the ECJ has recognised property rights in reputation per
se.”
The connection between the expansive protection and the conceptual propertization of trade-marks is also important to the extent that it offers some insight into
the moral dimension of the ECJ’s ruling. As stated above, the language employed
by the Court reveals a conviction that free-riding is inherently wrong. While there
is no discernable economic rationale for its position, the tone of moral disapprobation in the Court’s judgment is readily apparent. This would suggest that the judgment was informed not by economics but by a greater sense of right and wrong,
which was in turn informed by a certain perception of the plaintiff’s “ethical entitlement.”119 The owner’s entitlement, as perceived by the ECJ, appears to flow
from the “marketing effort expended. . .in order to create and maintain the image of
that mark.”120 The notion that the investment of effort or labour creates an entitlement over the fruits of that labour is closely connected to a vision of intellectual
property as a matter of natural right. As I have argued elsewhere, the consequence
of such a vision is the overprotection of the owner, and the failure to adequately
consider competing rights and interests.121 In this case, the user of the mark is cast
as someone who reaps without sowing, someone who seeks to benefit from another’s pains to which he has no right. At the same time, the public interest that
may be served by the defendant’s activities (here, the consumer’s interest in knowing of a cheaper equivalent product) drops out of the picture.
In sum, the rule against free-riding that appears to have emerged from the
L’Oréal case is overly restrictive of the activities and competitive practices of third
parties, and lacks any sound basis in traditional trade-mark law or economic theory.
Rather, it is indicative of the kind of overprotection of intellectual property rights
that results from a moral perception of trade-marks as a species of private property.
A broad prohibition against “taking advantage” of the reputation of a protected
mark does not serve, but rather undermines, the interests of consumers, market
competitors and the public in general.

(b) Trade-mark Law and the Right of Free Expression
A further source of controversy surrounding the L’Oréal case is the clear but
unacknowledged restriction that the judgment imposes on good faith competitors’
commercial speech; at its core, the ruling prevented the defendant trader from making honest statements about his lawful products. Under traditional, common law
trade-mark principles, a defendant does no wrong by selling a lawful competing
118

Björkenfeldt, supra note 26 at 106.
Gangee & Burrell, supra note 15 at 291.
120 L’Oreal (ECJ), supra note 1 at para. 50.
121 See Carys Craig, “Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning Against
a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law” (2002) 28 Queen’s L.J. 1.
119
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product where the public is correctly informed about the source and quality of the
product being sold. Thus, in the famous Seiko case, the Supreme Court of Canada
chose not to deprive the Canadian public of the right or option to purchase the
defendant’s Seiko watches without a warranty and for a cheaper price.122 Because
the public knew what they paying for (and not paying for), there was no basis for
the law to intervene to establish the plaintiff’s monopoly on the sale of Seiko
watches. To find otherwise would have produced “startling results,” according to
the Supreme Court, given the “benefits to the community from free and fair competition.”123 In the L’Oréal case, there was no question that the defendant was within
its rights to manufacture and offer for sale the smell-alike products; the only real
question, then was “whether he was entitled to inform the public about what he was
actually offering, or whether he had to leave it to his customers to find out — for
instance by sniffing the available brands. . .”124
Jacob L.J. honed in on this question, casting the problem in the following
terms: “Does trade mark law prevent the defendants from telling the truth? Even
though their perfumes are lawful and do smell like the corresponding famous
brands, does trade mark law nonetheless muzzle the defendants so that they cannot
say so?” To this he answered: “[T]he ECJ’s ruling is that the defendants are indeed
muzzled.”125 If he were able to decide the case free from the opinion of the ECJ,
Jacob L.J. confessed to a “strong predilection” that “trade mark law did not prevent
traders from making honest statements about their products where those products
are themselves lawful.”126 By way of explanation, Jacob L.J. declared himself to be
in favour of free speech, especially when someone wishes to tell the truth, and even
if that truth is told with a motive of commercial gain because “truth in the market
place matters.”127
Of course, freedom of expression (including commercial expression) is guaranteed by various international human rights documents including Article 10(1) of
the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, this right is guaranteed
not only to the speaker who wishes to tell the truth, but also to those who would
wish to hear it. In Jacob L.J.’s view, “the hearer’s right to receive information
translates into the right of the consumer to make an informed choice about products
on the market.”128 From this it follows that the ECJ’s decision in the case denies to
consumers “their right to receive information which would give them a little bit of
pleasure; the ability to buy a product for a euro or so which they know smells like a
famous perfume.”129 Of course, the trade-mark owner may not want the buying
public to know that the essential characteristic of its wares can be imitated for a
122
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Consumers Distributing Co. v. Seiko Time Canada Ltd., 1984 CarswellOnt 869, 1984
CarswellOnt 801, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 583, 1 C.P.R. (3d) 1, 10 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 54 N.R.
161, 29 C.C.L.T. 296, 3 C.I.P.R. 223 (S.C.C.).
Ibid. at 595 [S.C.R.].
Kur et al., supra note 33 at 3.
L’Oréal (EWCA 2), supra note 2 at para. 6.
Ibid. at para. 8.
Ibid. at para. 9.
Ibid. at para. 12.
Ibid. at para. 15.
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fraction of the price at which it sells its luxury brand, but there needs to be a
stronger reason than that in order for the law to suppress the truth.130
The relationship between the protection of trade-marks and the guarantee of
freedom of expression is one that is typically obscured by the separate legal silos in
which these rights operate, and it is therefore seldom acknowledged by courts or
lawmakers. It is undeniable, however, that the enforcement of intellectual property
rights including trade-mark rights frequently imposes a legal limitation upon a defendant’s expressive activity. As trade-mark rights expand beyond the protection
against consumer confusion, the tension between these rights and free speech values become harder to ignore. Jacob L.J. cited with approval the case of Laugh it Off
Promotions v. South African Breweries, in which the Constitutional Court of South
Africa warned: “Courts must be astute not to convert the anti-dilution safeguard of
renowned trade marks usually controlled by powerful financial interests into a monopoly adverse to other claims of expressive conduct of at least equal cogency and
worth in our broader society.”131
Under European law, any encroachment onto the freedom of expression guarantee must be justified and proportionate.132 The ECJ, however, apparently gave no
consideration to the human rights issues presented by the L’Oréal scenario. It was
seemingly blind to the question of whether the restriction on advertising of lawful
goods was consistent with consumers’ rights to receive relevant commercial information or traders’ freedom of commercial speech. As I have argued elsewhere, this
seeming blindness to the tensions at play is symptomatic of a larger problem with
the conceptualization of intellectual property rights; specifically, the intuition that
trade-marks are property obscures the conflict between trade-mark law and the
freedom of expression guarantee.133 Perhaps the most illustrative example of this is
found in the Canadian case of Cie Générale des Etablissements Michelin-Michelin
& Cie v. C.A.W.-Canada,134 in which the court dismissed a defendant’s freedom of
expression defence in an action for copyright and trade-mark infringement on the
ground that “the Defendants’ right to freedom of expression was not restricted. The
Charter [of Rights and Freedoms] does not confer the right to use private property. . . in the service of freedom of expression.”135
Similarly, in L’Oréal, the ECJ’s perception of the defendant’s comparison lists
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as merely an instance of “free-riding” on the plaintiff’s mark blinded it to the expressive nature of those comparison lists and the free speech aspects of the case. In
the U.K., it has at least been acknowledged that intellectual property rights will not
always trump free expression. In Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd.,136 Lord Phillips M.R. wrote that “rare circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of
expression will come into conflict with the protection afforded by the Copyright
Act. . . In these circumstances, we consider that the court is bound, insofar as it is
able, to apply the Act in a manner that accommodates the right of freedom of expression.”137 Unfortunately, in light of the ECJ’s ruling, the Court of Appeal did
not feel free to interpret the provisions of the TMD or the CAD in a way that would
cohere with the principles of free expression. The result is that “the interest of perfume makers in preserving their image of exclusivity is preferred to that of consumers in receiving information of relevance to their purchasing decision.”138 Fundamentally, this means that the protection of exclusive trade-mark rights is preferred
over the social goals and values embodied by the freedom of expression guarantee.

4. LESSONS FROM L’ORÉAL
While the L’Oréal ruling was reasoned and decided on the basis of European
trade-mark law, it is important to stress, by way of conclusion, that there are some
valuable lessons to be learned from this case, which Canadian courts and
lawmakers would be well-advised to heed. Fortunately, unlike the British court, a
Canadian court hearing a similar case would not be bound to follow the ECJ’s
lead — and nor should it. Indeed, the case stands for what not to do. In this final
section, I will set out three lessons that can be learned from L’Oréal, and which
have the potential to positively inform and influence the future interpretation and
development of trade-mark law in Canada.
First, it is important to note the concerns that have been raised regarding the
ECJ’s identification of trade-mark functions beyond the essential function of a
trade-mark as an identifier of source (these functions included guaranteeing the
quality of goods or services and those of communication, investment or advertising). In Canada, the Trade-Marks Act (TMA)139 creates, in section 19, an exclusive
right to the use of a registered mark in association with the same wares or services
for which the mark is registered (effectively equivalent to Article 5(1)(a) of the
TMD). The Canadian case of Clairol International Corp. v. Thomas Supply &
Equipment Co.140 involved the comparative advertising of hair dyes. The defendant
in that case claimed that its colours were “so close to Clairol’s as to be just as
good,” and in order to substantiate that claim, it produced a colour comparison
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chart to identify equivalent dye colours. The plaintiff, of course, objected to the use
of the CLAIROL mark that appeared on the packages and promotional brochures
for the defendant’s REVLON products. The plaintiff’s section 19 action failed,
however, because the defendant’s use “was not a use for the purpose of distinguishing the goods as goods of the defendants and for that reason alone was not a use the
exclusive right to which had been conferred on the plaintiffs by section 19.”141 The
court was concerned only with the essential function of the trade-mark as an indicator of source.
This is an important limitation on the plaintiff’s exclusive rights in relation to
the registered mark. Implicit in this limitation is the recognition that a trade-mark is
not a piece of property but rather is protected only because of, and to the extent of,
its capacity to indentify source in the marketplace. In order to avoid the undue
expansion of the trade-mark owner’s exclusive right to control the use of its mark,
not to mention the ambiguity introduced by the additional, undefined functions
identified in L’Oréal, it is crucial that the application of both sections 19 and 20142
of the Canadian TMA continues to be limited to cases where the origin-identifying
function of the mark is implicated.
Second, it is necessary to consider the appropriate limits on the expansive
rights protected by section 22 of the Canadian TMA (which essentially corresponds
to Article 5(2) of the TMD). Section 22 gives to the registered owner the right to
prevent another person from using the mark “in a manner that is likely to have the
effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching thereto” even where that
use is not confusing. The potential scope of this right is enormous, and clearly capable of restricting basic competitive practices as well as commercial (and other)
speech. A use that falls foul of section 22 need not be use “as a trade-mark” to
identify source; it is enough that the use depreciates the value of the mark’s goodwill. Unless the meaning of section 22 is kept in check, its capacity to prevent all
kinds of expressive, nominative or descriptive uses is a cause for concern.
In Clairol, Justice Thurlow found that the comparison charts on the defendant’s packaging were in violation of section 22 because they used the plaintiff’s
registered mark “for the express purpose of taking away custom enjoyed by competitors.”143 This conclusion followed from Justice Thurlow’s understanding of
what it means to “depreciate the value” of goodwill: “Depreciation of that value in
my opinion occurs whether it arises through reduction of the esteem in which the
mark itself is held or through the direct persuasion and enticing of customers who
could otherwise be expected to buy or continue to buy goods bearing the trademark.”144 This definition, which invokes the idea of diminishing demand for the
trade-mark owner’s wares or usurping his custom, falls dangerously close to the
ECJ’s understanding of what it means to take “unfair advantage” of another’s reputation. While it was accepted that, as a matter of fact, purchasers of L’Oréal’s ex-
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pensive fragrances would be unlikely to buy the cheap equivalents in their place,
the defendant in L’Oréal was clearly trying to entice if not would-be then “wannabe” purchasers of those brands. Furthermore, no consideration was given to the
truthfulness of the comparison in determining its lawfulness.
In Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin c. Boutiques Cliquot Ltée, the Supreme Court of
Canada had the opportunity to weigh in on the scope of section 22. The Court cited
with approval the definition of goodwill adopted in Clairol, defining it as “the positive association that attracts customers towards its owner’s wares or services rather
than that of its competitor.”145 In identifying the kinds of activities that could depreciate the value of a mark’s goodwill thus defined, the Court mentioned “disparagement” or “tarnishing” of the mark through the creation of a negative association,
as well as “blurring” or “whittling away” its power to distinguish the owner’s products.146 The Court took care, however, to emphasize that the notions of blurring
and tarnishment were not limiting but merely illustrative of the kinds of uses that
could cause “depreciation” within the meaning of section 22, as “Canadian courts
have not yet had an opportunity to explore its limits.”147
In my opinion, Canadian courts would be well-advised to restrict the prohibition in section 22 to cases of blurring or tarnishment causing or likely to cause
measurable harm. Certainly, learning from the L’Oréal decision, Canadian courts
should take care to avoid the conclusion that any advantage gained by the nonconfusing use of another’s trade-mark amounts to depreciating the value of goodwill in that mark. There is no default presumption that “free-riding” is unlawful,
and reaping the benefit of another’s goodwill in some way does not necessarily
translate into depreciating its value. It would be most regrettable if section 22 were
permitted to become a “catch-all” for any use of a well-known trade-mark that a
court may regard as taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character of reputation of another’s mark.
Finally, in light of the L’Oréal case, Canadian courts and lawmakers should
have a new appreciation of the dangers that accompany the overprotection of trademarks in terms of undesirable restrictions on both free competition and free expression. In Canadian trade-mark law there is, for example, no exception to liability for
the fair use of a protected mark. The doctrinal limits of trade-mark protection (such
as the need for a plaintiff to establish confusion in the marketplace, or the inability
to control non-commercial or non-trade-mark uses) typically do a decent job of
drawing the boundaries around the registered owner’s rights. Section 22, however,
threatens to offer more expansive control. In the United States, protection against
the dilution of the distinctive quality of a famous mark is limited by section
1125(4) of the Lanham Act, which shields from liability non-commercial uses, uses
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in news reporting, and “fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of
the owner of the famous mark.”148 In my opinion, the L’Oréal case reveals the
wisdom of inserting into Canada’s TMA a similar exception from liability for fair
(which must include truthful) comparative advertising that makes good faith use of
registered trade-marks to identify the subject of the comparison. In the absence of a
legislative exception, courts should be prepared to read one in as a matter of
principle.
As a related point, it is hoped that Canadian courts heed the concerns raised
around the L’Oréal case regarding the tension between trade-mark rights and the
right of freedom of expression, which is of course guaranteed by section 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.149 It is time to depart from the notion
of trade-mark as property and to acknowledge the expressive function of trademarks in the marketplace and in our culture at large. A renewed awareness of the
limitations imposed by trade-marks on the expressive activities of competitors and
the general public would permit (indeed demand) the incorporation of free expression principles in the development and application of trade-mark law. These principles should inform the limits of the rights that trade-mark law affords.

5. CONCLUSION
L’Oréal v. Bellue is a remarkable case. The ruling of the ECJ, as reluctantly
applied by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, protects the plaintiff’s trademark rights against free-riding and prohibits the defendants from taking any commercial advantage of the reputation attaching to the plaintiff’s famous perfume
brands. In doing so, it limits free competition and commercial expression without
identifying any real harm (consumer confusion, blurring or tarnishment of the
marks) or providing any clear public benefit that would justify such intervention. In
this way, the case reflects a perception of trade-mark rights as private property, and
the owner of a valuable trade-mark as morally entitled to absolute protection due to
his investment in the creation of the brand. In Canada, we should seize the opportunity to learn from this ruling, prepare to avoid the mistakes of the ECJ in future
comparative adverting cases, and aim to protect the rights and interests of Canadian
traders and the public against any similar expansion of trade-mark protection in
Canada — because we’re worth it!
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